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Age
The court noted in S v Mbelo 2003 (1) SACR 84 (NCD) that `[w]here the age of
either an accused or a complainant is material to either the offence or to
sentence, hearsay evidence thereof is admissible' (at para 8). (See also S v
Moeketsi 1976 (4) SA 838 (O); S v Magqabudi 1983 (4) SA 54 (Tk). Majiedt J
also held that a baptismal certificate was not sufficient proof of age.
However, the court held that formal admissions made by the accused's legal
representative in the pleadings were binding and sufficient proof of the ages
in question.
Alibi
In S v Thebus 2002 (2) SACR 566 (SCA) the court had to consider the veracity
of an alibi raised for the first time at the trial which took place some two years
after the incident in question. Lewis AJA (Olivier JA concurring) held, that the
only inference to be drawn from such late disclosure was that `the alibi' had
no truth in it al all. The Law Commission's proposal in its Report on
Simplification of Criminal Procedure A more inquisitorial approach to
criminal procedure Ð police questioning, defence disclosure, the role of
judicial officers and judicial management of trial (2002), that late disclosure
of an alibi should be prohibited save with the leave of the court appears
somewhat redundant given the negative inference that is clearly permissible
at common law.
Computer Evidence
In S v Mashiyi 2002 (2) SACR 387 (TkD), Miller J held that documents
containing information that had to be processed and generated by a
computer were inadmissible in a criminal trial. (See also S v Harper 1981 (1)
SA 88 (D). The reasoning of the court is not examined here as hopefully the
seemingly insurmountable barrier to the admission of such documents in
criminal cases has been cured by the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act 25 of 2002. The Act defines a `data' message as `data
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and includes Ð
(a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and (b) a
stored record (s 1; emphasis added). `Data' is defined as the `electronic
representations of information in any form' (s 1). Section 15 of the Act
regulates the admission of data messages and reads as follows:
`(1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to
deny the admissibility of a data message, in evidence
(a) on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or
(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be
expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original form.
(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due evidential
weight.
(3) In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard must be had to±
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated,
stored or communicated;
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was
maintained;
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and
(d) any other relevant factor.
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or a copy
or printout of or an extract from such data message certified to be correct by an
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officer in the service of such person, is on its mere production in any civil,
criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings under any law, the rules of
a self regulatory organisation or any other law or the common law, admissible
in evidence against any person and rebuttable proof of the facts contained in
such record, copy, printout or extract.'
Discharge at the close of the state case
Unfortunately the judgments handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeal
in S v Lubaxa 2001 (2) SACR 703 (SCA) and S v Legote 2001 (2) SACR 179
(SCA) were not available to Maya J at the time of writing the judgment in S v
Tusani 2002 (2) SACR 468 (TD). Nevertheless, the finding of the court in
Tusani is consistent with the reasoning of Nugent AJA (as he was then) in
Lubaxa in so far as he holds that the requirement of a prima facie case need
not be met in order to avoid discharge, `where the prosecution's case against
one accused might be supplement by the evidence of a co-accused' (at para
20). This judgment is criticised in (2002) 15 SACJ 141.
Evaluation of evidence
The Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Trainor 2003 (1) SACR 35 (SCA)
endorsed the approach to the evaluation of evidence as set out by Nugent J
(as he was then) in S v Van der Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 447 (W) 449h±450b.
Navsa JA elaborated (at para 9) as follows:
`A conspectus of all the evidence is required. Evidence that is reliable should be
weighed alongside such evidence as may be found to be false. Independently
verifiable evidence, if any, should be weighed to see if it supports any of the
evidence tendered. In considering whether evidence is reliable, the quality of that
evidence must of necessity be evaluated, as must corroborative evidence, if any.
Evidence, of course, must be evaluated against the onus on any particular issue or
in respect of the case in its entirety. The compartmentalised and fragmented
approach of the magistrate is illogical and wrong.'
Hearsay
The court in S v Ndlovu 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA) dealt with the admission of
hearsay evidence in terms of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1988.
Cameron JA made the following general observations regarding the
appropriate manner in which to safeguard the fair trial rights of an accused
when dealing with the admissibility of hearsay evidence. First, presiding
officers should actively guard against the inadvertent admission of
inadmissible evidence. Second, it is essential that unrepresented accused
have the provisions of the Act properly explained to them. (See also S v
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Congola 2002 (2) SACR 383 (T).`Third, an accused cannot be ambushed by
the late or unheralded admission of hearsay evidence. The trial court must be
asked clearly and timeously to consider and rule on its admissibility' (at para
18). Fourth, it should be borne in mind that a ruling on the admissibility of
evidence is one of law and can be overruled by an appeal court.
The more specific question was formulated by Cameron JA as follows: can
`an accused's out-of-court statement incriminating a co-accused, if disavowed
at the trial, . . . nevertheless be used in evidence against the latter' (at para 1).
The court a quo had answered the question in the affirmative on the basis
that the statement was admissible in terms of s 3(1)(b) of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act 1988 and did not need to be repeated under oath. (S v
Ndlovu 2001 (1) SACR 85 (W), for a further discussion of this case see 2001
(14) SACJ 262). In terms of s 3(1)(b) hearsay evidence may be admitted `if the
person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence
depends, himself testifies at such proceedings'. This should be read together
with s 3(3) which reads; `Hearsay evidence may be provisionally admitted in
terms of ss (1)(b) if the court is informed that the person upon whose
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, will himself testify
in such proceedings. Provided that if such person does not later testify in
such proceedings, the hearsay evidence shall be left out to account unless the
hearsay evidence is admitted' by consent or in the interests of justice. The
Supreme Court of Appeal found that the central flaw in the court a quo's
finding was that the danger inherent in the admission of hearsay evidence `is
that it maybe untrustworthy since it cannot be subject to cross-examination'
(at para 30). This danger will occur not only when the hearsay declarant is
not called as a witness, but when he or she is called and `does not confirm the
statement, or repudiates it' (at para 30). Consequently, in such circumstances
the court may not automatically admit the statement in terms of s 3(1)(b) and
must proceed to determine whether the interests of justice require the
statement's admission. In other words admissibility falls to be determined
through the application of s 3(1)(c).
With regard to the constitutionality of the hearsay rule as formulated in s 3
of the 1988 Act the court concluded that there was no infringement of the
constitutional right to challenge evidence. Cameron JA reasoned as follows
(at para 24):
`It has correctly been observed that the admission of hearsay evidence ``by
definition denies an accused the right to cross-examine'', since the declarant is not
in court and cannot be cross-examined. I cannot accept, however, that ``use of
hearsay evidence by the state violates the accused's right to challenge evidence by
cross-examination'', if it is meant that the inability to cross-examine the source of a
statement in itself violates the right to `challenge' evidence. The Bill of Rights does
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not guarantee an entitlement to subject all evidence to cross-examination. What it
contains is the right (subject to limitation in terms of s 36) to ``challenge evidence''.
Where that evidence is hearsay, the right entails that the accused is entitled to resist
its admission and to scrutinise its probative value, including its reliability. The
provisions enshrine these entitlements. But where the interests of justice,
constitutionally measured, require that hearsay evidence be admitted, no
constitutional right is infringed. Put differently, where the interests of justice
require that the hearsay statement be admitted, the right to ``challenge evidence''
does not encompass the right to cross-examine the original declarant.'
It is submitted that the court in reaching this conclusion failed to fully explore
the content of the right to challenge evidence and the essential role played by
cross-examination. Even the most considered application of s 3 cannot
compensate for the inability to use cross-examination Ð to explore
contradictions between witnesses and apparent inconsistencies in a
witness's statement; to elicit favourable information and extract information
that might have been left out or under-emphasised in evidence-in-chief.
There can be little doubt that s 3 would meet the requirements of the
limitations clause however, the failure to find an infringement and engage in
a limitations analysis has potentially diminished the content of the right to
challenge evidence.
Exculpatory statement by the accused
During the course of a trial the prosecution handed in as evidence an
exculpatory statement made by a co-accused (the appellant) to the police.
The appellant's legal representative consented to the handing in of the
statement. The magistrate disregarded the statement on the basis that it did
not form part of the evidence. On appeal, Pillay J in S v Mali 2002 (2) SACR
597 (E) held that the magistrate had misdirected himself in not taking the
statement into account in that it was admissible hearsay evidence in terms of
s 3(1)(a) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 which permits
hearsay evidence to be admitted by consent.
Identification evidence
In S v Matwa 2002 (2) SACR 350 (E), Leach J held that ruling S v Maradu 1994
(2) SACR 410 (W) that evidence of dock identification should only be
admissible in special circumstances went `too far' (at 355d). The court held
that the better approach to be adopted is that such evidence is admissible but
the circumstances in each case will determine the weight to be attached to
the identification. (See also S v Bailey unreported case No. 215/2000 (C)
which is discussed in (2002) 15 SACJ 269.)
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Improperly obtained evidence
In S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA) the court held that in the circumstances
evidence improperly obtained from a third party did not affect the fairness of
the appellant's trial. Heher AJA confirmed the existence of a common-law
discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence (see S v Hammer 1994
(2) SACR 496 (C)) but held that the facts of the case did not justify the
exercise of such a discretion. In reaching this conclusion the court noted (at
para 31) that:
`Real evidence which is procured by illegal or improper means is generally more
readily admitted than evidence so obtained which depends upon the say-so of a
witness. . .the reason being that it usually possesses an objective reliability. It does
not ``conscript the accused against himself''. . ..'
The court also noted that despite the improper surrounding circumstances
there was no conduct by the policeman in question that `was consciously
directed at finding or obtaining possession of the letter' (at 432i) (the letter
being the improperly obtained evidence in question). Furthermore admitting
the letter would not constitute approval or encouragement of improper
police conduct.
Previous convictions
In both S v Njikaza 2002 (2) SACR 481 (C) and S v Smith 2002 (2) SACR 488
(C) the court held that is was a serious irregularity for a magistrate to question
an accused on his previous convictions where the state declines to prove
previous convictions. Clearly, previous convictions may be relevant to
sentence and perhaps the courts' impartiality would be sufficiently protected
if a legislative duty was placed on prosecutors to adduce such evidence or a
tender a reasonable explanation as to why they are unable to do so.
Sexual offences
Prior to S v Van der Ross 2002 (2) SACR 362 (C) it could be argued that the
Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA) abolished
the cautionary rule applicable to complainants in sexual offence cases and
simply required that the complainant's evidence be approached in the same
way as any other witness; the court only taking a cautionary approach when
there was an evidential basis for doing so. However, Thring J in Van der Ross
in finding an evidentiary basis for exercising caution in the sexual nature of
the charge effectively circumvents the Supreme Courts of Appeal's ruling that
this cautionary rule is irrational and outdated and has no place in South
African law. If Jackson is capable of such an interpretation, it can only be
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hoped that the recommendations of the South African Law Commission
(Project 107, Sexual Offences Report (2002) para 5.3.3) will be acted upon
and that this iniquitous rule will be legislatively abolished.
In contrast the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v M 2002 (2)
SACR 411 (SCA) is to be welcomed in its support of the South African Law
Commission (op cit para 5.6.3) proposals in respect of the approach to be
adopted in determining the admissibility of prior sexual history evidence.
Section 227(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 is directed at protecting
a complainant in a sexual offence case from humiliating, hostile and
irrelevant questioning. It prohibits the defence from adducing evidence of
the complainant's prior sexual history (cross-examination is similarly
prohibited) without leave of the court, the court will only grant such leave
if it is satisfied that the evidence or questioning is relevant. Unfortunately,
whilst this provision has been in force since 1989, there is little evidence of
the prosecution invoking it in order to protect complainants and it is not
surprising that Heher AJA in S v M (at 422h) noted: `The members of this
Court are not aware of any instance where s 227(2) has been applied in this
country.' Heher AJA noted that the South African Law Commission
(Discussion Paper 102, Project 107, Sexual Offences: Process and Procedures
(2002) 501) had noted that one of the reasons for the failure of s 227(2) in
protecting complainants was the wide discretion conferred on magistrates in
determining relevance. The Law Commission has accordingly proposed that
evidence of prior sexual history only be admitted if it satisfied that such
evidence or questioning:
`(a) relates to a specific instance of sexual activity relevant to a fact in issue;
(b) is likely to rebut evidence previously adduced by the prosecution;
(c) is likely to explain the presence of semen or the source of pregnancy or
disease or any injury to the complainant where it is relevant to a fact in issue;
or
(d) is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice to the complainant's
personal dignity and right to privacy; or
(e) is fundamental to the accused's defence.'
Heher AJA held that although the above proposal had no legislative status,
the criteria identified should nevertheless be taken into account in
determining admissibility. He also quoted with approval the following
extract from Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 1977
(24-100B) setting out the approach to be taken in determining the
admissibility of prior sexual history evidence:
`[s]everal . . . policy concerns which militate against admissibility . . . must be taken
to the balance. These include the need to protect witnesses from hurtful, harassing
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and humiliating attacks, the recognition of a person's right to privacy in the highly
sensitive areas of sexuality and the realisation that the exposure of their sexual
history may deter many victims of sexual offences from testifying.'
The court noting that there had be a complete failure of the court a quo to
apply s 227(2) and that the evidence in question `served no purpose other
than the impermissible one of destroying the complainant's credit' (at 426b)
held that the evidence (in the form of an affidavit) had been improperly
admitted and should be struck from the record.
Witnesses
Incriminating evidence by witness for the prosecution
Moseneke J in S v Mokoena 2003 (1) SACR 74 (T) stressed the importance of
adhering to the prescribed warning set out in s 204(1)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 1977. (Section 204 comes into play when a state witness
waives his or her privilege against self-incrimination in exchange for
discharge from prosecution provided that they testify frankly and honest-
ly.) The magistrate in the court a quo appears to have paid little attention to
the contents of s 204 and warned two accomplice witnesses `to give evidence
``favourable to the State'' and that their failure to do so shall result in charges
against them being reinstated' (at 78a). Such a warning, the review court
held, constituted undue influence on the accomplice witnesses and severely
undermined the reliability of their testimony. The court held that the irregular
warning in terms of s 204 constituted a gross irregularity which was
compounded by another irregularity in that the magistrate appears to have
discharged the witnesses before they testified. Moseneke J held that although
these irregularities were not fatal to the entire proceedings the evidence of
the two accomplice witnesses had to be excluded when evaluating the
conviction.
Children Ð oath
There have been a disquieting number of cases in which convictions of rape,
where the complainant has been a child, have been set aside on review
because of irregularities in the administration of the oath or admonition. The
South African Law Commission (Project 107, Sexual Offences Report (2002)
para 4.3.4) has proposed that s 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 be
amended so that the inquiry be restricted to an ability to understand and
respond to questions put to him or her. However, legislative reform is
uncertain and in any event slow. Consequently, the common sense approach
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v B 2003 (1) SACR 52 (SCA) is
to be welcomed.
96 SACJ . (2003) 16
The accused was convicted in the regional court on a charge of rape and
referred to the High Court for sentencing. Before proceeding to testify, the
13-year-old complainant was asked whether she understood what it meant to
swear to tell the truth and what it meant to tell the truth, thereafter she was
warned to tell the truth. When the matter came before the High Court for
sentencing the court set the conviction aside and replaced it with a finding of
not guilty as the complainant's evidence had to be excluded as there had
been no investigation to justify a finding that the witness did not understand
the nature and import of the oath or affirmation due to ignorance arising from
youth, defective education or other cause. (See ss 162 and 164 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 1977). The prosecution applied for the following questions of
law to be reserved: (a) whether the absence of such an investigation
rendered the evidence inadmissible, and (b) whether such evidence was to
be completely disregarded when the matter came before the High Court for
sentencing.
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that a formally noted investigation into
a witness' ability to understand the oath or affirmation although preferable,
was not always necessary. It was possible that in certain circumstances it
would be apparent when attempting to administer the oath that there was a
lack of the requisite understanding, and in some cases the young age of the
witness could on its own justify such a finding. The circumstances merely had
to be such that they sustained the opinion of the presiding officer that the
witness did not understand the nature and import of the oath and affirmation
as a result of ignorance arising from youth, defective education or other
cause. The court found that in the circumstances there was non-compliance
with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and the
complainant's evidence was inadmissible. However, this did not mean that
the court had no option but to acquit the accused. Streicher JA held that
alternatives were to be found in s 52(3)(d) and (e) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997. Section 52(3)(d) provides that the High Court to
which a matter has been referred to for sentencing may `hear any evidence
and for that purpose summon any person to appear to give evidence or to
produce any document or other article'. In terms of s 52(3)(e) a court can
confirm or alter a conviction and impose a sentence; set aside the conviction,
`remit the case to the regional court with instruction to deal with any matter in
such manner as the High Court may deem fit'; or `make any such order in
regard to any matter or thing connected with such person or the proceedings
in regard to such person as the High Court deems likely to promote the ends
of justice'.
The Supreme Court of Appeal noted that the complainant's evidence was of
material importance and that the objection to its admissibility was purely of a
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technical natureÐ and investigation into the complainant's understanding of the
nature and import of the oath or admonition would not have made her evidence
any more reliable. Consequently, the High Court should have given
consideration to the options available to it in terms of s 52(3)(d) and (e) and
how these could be best applied without infringing the accused's fair trial rights.
The court noted that the interests of justice required the courts not only to guard
against incorrect convictions but also ensure that those guilty of crimes were
properly punished. The variety of options available to the High Court included
the following: hearing of further evidence, requiring the complainant to confirm
her evidence after complying with ss 162, 163 and 164 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, requiring the complainant to repeat her evidence and be subject to cross-
examination on the repeated evidence, the matter be referred back to the
regional court for the evidence to be heard in the appropriate manner. Streicher
JA (Harms JA and Schutz JA concurring) held that the court a quo had erred in
disregarding the evidence of the complainant and failing to consider the
appropriate exercise of its powers in terms of s 52(3) of Act 105 of 1997. The
court ordered that the case be referred back to the court a quo to consider
reopening for rehearing either by the court a quo or regional court.
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